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Abstract
._-----------------------------
This paper studies the historical deve10pment of the regulatory process in India and the subsequent 
effect of regulatory controls on market structure, market perfonnance, and product choice. The 
major proponents of the infant-industry arguments that subsequent1y led to tight internal and 
external (regulatory) baniers were the industrialists. It is seen that under the effect of regulatory 
controls there was no product innovation in the car industry which was under stricter controls than 
the scooter industry. There exist characteristics common to both industries. There was a 
substantial waiting period in both industries between the placement ofthe order, and the delivery of 
the good. After the relaxation of the market controls both industries witnessed entry and exit. 
There was an improvement in product mix and product qauality after the relaxation ofthe controls. 
*Departamento de Economía, Universidad Carlos 111. Special thanks to Mark Isaac for 
several helpful suggestions. The author acknowledges support from the DGICYT grant No. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper studies the historical development of the regulatory process and 
its effect upon some of the industries in India. The regulatory experience in India is 
interesting due to its origins. Many factors, working together, are attributable to 
the regulatory chaos that was eventually erected. It is clear that principies of 
'ideologyI> played a dominant role than fundamental economic principies. The 
industrialists played an important role in the formulation of domestic policy and 
were infact supporters ofthe barriers, internal and external, that were erected. 
It is also clear that the industries studied in this paper had no incentive, and 
did not, invest in Research and Development, and infact produced practically the 
same product for a period of 30 years. This lack of initiative on the part of the 
industrialists completely negates the usefulness of the infant industry argument. At 
the time when the barriers were eased (not completely removed) the incumbent 
firms lost market share to the new entrants. The quality and variety of the products 
increased after the easing ofthe regulatory controls. 
This paper is stuctured as follows. First, the evolution of the Indian 
planning ideology is studied. This is followed with a study of the car and the 
scooter industry and the specific regulatory regimes prevalent in the two industries. 
Then the industrial structure prevalent is studied in both the industries. The paper 
1 As is discussed below. 
-._-----_.---------------¡----------------------------­
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concludes with a study of the gainers and the losers in the Indian regulatory­
deregulatory experience and the conclusion. 
2. Evolution ofthe Indian planning ideology 
The Indian planning ideology emerged much before India gained 
independence in 1947. The Congress party sponsored the National Planning 
Cornmittee (NPC) with lawaharlal Nehru2 as it's Chairman. The NPC was formed 
at the initiative of the national leaders at that time. One thing notable about this 
committee was that it represented ideas of the Congress party, the provincial 
governments and the private businesses.. Evidence suggests that private business in 
India took a major role in the formulation ofthe IDR3 Act4,5. 
The intention of the planners, from the start, was to pursue a socialist 
pattem of society. Nehru was visibly impressed with what he saw in Russia and 
2 India's first Prime Minister. 
The Industries Development (and Regulalion) Act. 
4 In 1944, sorne prominent private industrialisls also prepared a plan known as the 'Bombay 
Plan'. D. Arnarchand, Promotion and Control of Private Industry in India, p.46, 1976, 
Department of Commerce, Annarnalai University. 
5 Nehru (Discovery of India) talking about the policy formulation for India says: 
"...But 1 was agreeably surprised at the large measure of unanimity achieved by us in 
spite of the incongruous elemenls in our commitlee. The big-business element was the biggest 
single group, and it's outlook on many rnatlers, especially financial and commercial, was 
definitely conservative.. " p. 404. 
At another inslance Nehru commenls lhat big business joined lhe NPC as lhey realized 
thal they could serve their interesls betler from wilhin the NPC than oulside il. 
This seems to lend support to lhe hypolheses presenled by Sligler (A theory of Economic 
Regulation, BJ.E., 1971). SligIer proposed lhal self inleresled private groups rnay pursue 
regulation in their seIf ínleresl. 
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decided that this was the onIy way to remove income inequalities prevalent in 
India6• The intent was to base planning on equality ofincome and not by the profit 
motive. Thus, it was decided to keep the scope of free enterprise severely 
. d 7restncte . 
As far as intemational trade is concemed, the planners avoided being 
dependent upon intemational economies. The paranoia can be explained by 
looking at the Indian experience with the British corporations. Indian industry was 
systematically decimated because of the cheap imports from England (produced at 
large scale and much cheaper than the, primarily, hand made Indian goods). As a 
result, the Indian leaders (at that time8) were fearful ofthe industrial giants9. Out of 
this fear sprouted the planning ideology ofthe (Indian) leaders. To quote Nehru: 
"Political democracy has no meaning if it does not embrace economic 
democracy. And economic democracy is nothing but socialism." Address to the 
6 Economic Ideas of Jawaharial NehnJ, Janardan Audichya, 1977. 
7 "So, though we did not start with a well..<Jefined social theory, our social objectives were 
clear enough and afforded a common basis. The very essence of this planning was a large 
measure of regulation and co-ordination. Thus while free enterprise was not ruled out as such, 
it's scope was severely restricted" NehnJ, Discovery ofIndia, pA03. 
8 NehnJ (pA03, Discovery of India) says: 
"Intemational trade was certainly not excluded, but we were anxious to avoid being 
drawn into the whirlwind of economic imperialismo We wanted neither to be victims of an 
imperialist power nor to develop such tendencies ourselves. The first charge on the countries 
should be to meet the domestic needs of food, raw rnaterials, and manufactured goods. Surplus 
production would not be dumped abroad but be used for exchange of such commodities as we 
might require. To base our national economy on export rnarkets might lead to conflicts with the 
other nations and to sudden upsets when those rnarkets were closed to uso " 
9 "That huge combine, the Imperial Chemical Industries, has been repeatedly favored at the 
expense of the Indian industry.. ", Nehru, pA08, Discovery of India. 
--------------------------------,-----------,--------------------­
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AlCC session, Jaipur-AlCC, Econornic Review, 9-1, 1964, p.46 (in D. Amarchand,
 
see aboye).
 
We thus see that the tight regulatory controls both on Jrnports and internal
 
production has their roots in Jndia's experience with the British.
 
2.1 Industrial Regulation 
There are two docurnents that provide the guidelines for industrial 
developrnent. The first docurnent is the IDR Act and the second docurnent is the 
Economic Objectives Resolution (EOR). The IDR Act provided the guidelines for 
industrial developrnent, while EOR re-stated the socialistic objective of the Jndian 
Government. 
The IDR Act carne into effect on May 8, 1952. As stated in the 
docurnent," it lays stress on developrnent of industries and provides for an effective 
rnachinery for the purpose". It provided for the registration of existing industrial 
undertakings and licensing of new industrial undertakings. Sub c1ause (1) of c1ause 
11 states: 
"..no person or authority other than the central governrnent shall, after the 
cornmencernent of the Act establish any new industrial undertaking, except under 
and in accordance with the license issued in that behalf by the Central Governrnent, 
with the previous permission ofthe Central Government. .. Substantial expansion of 
industrial undertakings will also be subject to the sarne Jicensing provisions as the 
new industrial undertakings." 
AH undertakings were required to obtain a license, either to expand capacity or to 
enter the rnarket. 
......_--_._----------,--,------------------------­
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The industries to be regulated were placed under two categories, Schedule 
A and Schedule-B (Table 2.7). The industries under Schedule A were the exclusive 
responsibility of the state, while schedule B industries would be progressively state 
owned. However, the State's efforts in the industries in Schedule B were expected 
to be supplemented by private enterprise. Future development of the industries 
fal1ing outside these schedules was (in general) left to the initiative and enterprise of 
the private sector. 
The IDR Act focussed attention on pricing. The right prices for planning 
purposes were defined as: 
"...those that under al1 eXlstmg conditions, including full range of 
government policies, would give entrepreneurs and, more generally, producers, 
traders and consumers and savers incentives to act according to a particular 
development plan... Planning will be realistic when prices conform to the 
expectations of the planners. 11 10 
The prices of the products related to the scheduled industries carne under 
Section 15 ofthe IDR Act. 
The IDR Act also provided for overseeing the price or the quality of the 
good. Prices could be further controlled by declaring goods as essential 
cornmodities under the Essential Commodities Act (ECA). The ECA provided for 
the control of production, supply, and distribution in certain cornmodities, declared 
as 'essential' under Seco 2(a) ofthe Act, in the public interest. 
10 Gwmar Myrdal, Asian Drama, Vol. III, p.2037, in D.Amarchand (1976) . 
. -------------------------,r----------r---------------­
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We thus see that the IDR Act provided the government broad powers to 
interfere in the functioning of any industry. It should be noted that, in spite of the 
demarcation (for scheduled industries) , the state could undertake industrial 
production in any aspect ofthe economy. 
2.1.1 Modifications to the IDR Act 
There were several modifications to the IDR Act (of 1952). The majar 
modifications were made in 195611 , 1970, 1981 and 1984. 12 
The first majar change in the industrial policy carne in 1981 where 29 
medium sector industries were al10wed ful1er utilization of installed capacities. 
Diversification was also allowed in passenger cars and power driven two-wheeler 
industry. An undertaking could diversify within it's overall licensed capacity. The 
second majar change carne about in 1984. Here the govemrnent decided to exernpt 
entrepreneurs ofmediurn sized firms from the normal industrial procedure to enable 
them to set up industrial capacities based on indigenous equipment and local raw 
materials and, to utilize to a fuller extent the existing installed capacities. 13 
11 In 1955-1956 the Parliament accepted a socialist pattem of society as the objective. Thus a 
fresh statement of the industrial policy was necessitated to confonn to the socialist objectives and a 
fresh statement of the policy was thus announced on April 30, 1956. This policy did not deviate 
much from the IDR Act (1952). 
12 Most of these changes involved changing of the laws regarding licensing, recognition of 
capacities (in excess of licensed capacities), diversification (in output), capacity utilization and 
automatic expansion (annually or over a periad of five years) of current facilities. This Act has 
since been further revised. 
13 24 medium sized industries carne under this scheme. 
..--.....-.------------..,..-r-----------------------­
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Automatic growth was allowed to 24 groups ofindustries which are open for larger 
industrial houses and foreign concems along with other applicants and, 15 export 
oriented engineering industries. 14 To be eligible for this expansion the undertaking 
should not be a. dominant unit in the particular line of manufacture within the 
meaning ofthe MRTP (Monopoties and Restrictive Trade Practices) ACt. 15 
Another modification in the licensing policy was that the components sector 
was delicensed (except for the firms coming under FERA (Foreign Exchange 
Regulatory Act) and the MRTP Act). 
The second document, the Economic Objective Resolution was passed by 
the parliament in December, 1954. The resolution declared a socialistic pattem of 
society as the primary objective ofthe country. It states: 
14 These were allowed to grow at the rate of 5 % per annum or upto a ceiling of 25 % in five 
years in one or more steps over their licensed capacity provided the item was not reserved for 
Small Scale Industries or the Public Sector. The maximum capacity achieved over the last five 
years (over the licensed capacity) was recognized by the government. 
1~ The recognition of installed capacities in excess of licensed capacities had a peculiar feature 
to it. That is, this scheme was only applicable to the industries where the expansion of a firm 
does not lead to dominance in that industry. 1 think a Catch-22 situation exists here. That ¡s, 
through licensing, the government has created market concentration and as a result, if capacity 
expansion leads to a dominance of a firm, an incumbent firm would find it difficult to be granted 
the privilege to expand it's capacity. This seems to be a big hurdle if economies in production are 
to realized. This tradeoff between economic efficiency and market is not recognized in any of the 
documents 1 have looked or in the World Bank document (see aboye). We see that there exists a 
self defeating clause which would make the realization of economies of scale difficult. The car 
industry would be specifically affected where the incumbent firms were operating well below the 
MES. However, it is not clear whether the automobile industry made any attempt to expand 
capacity which was not allowed under this provision of the IDR Act. 
Also, in cases where an industry was not allowed to expand as it already had a semi­
monopoly, controlled prices were worked out to provide for replacement costs only. 
. .....__._-----------------,-------------------------------_. 
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"the basic criterion for deterrnining lines of advance must not be private 
profit, but social gain." (p. 50, D. Amarchand) 
We see that both ofthese documents were influenced by Nehru's thinking. 
That is, to achieve the socialistic economic objectives, private industry should be 
tightly regulated. 
2.1.2. The MRTP Act 
The :MRTP Act was instituted in 1969. This Act imposes severe 
restrictions upon the growth oflarge industrial houses. 16 The Act could be broadly 
divided into two parts. The first part dealing with concentration17 and the second, 
dealing with restrictive trade practices. The concepts of 'monopoly' and 
'concentration of wealth' were not defined till 1970. In 1970 official interpretation 
16 The bias in India against large private industrial houses is evident from this quote: 
"....unlike the Americans, Euro~s, and Japanese, we do not worship giant private 
enterprises as guardians of modero civilization and instruments of national power. We only fear 
them and promote their growth as inevitable aceompaniments of developments." R. K. Hazari, 
(Rapporteur), Indian Economic Conference, Monopolies and their regulation in India, p. viii, in 
D. Amarchand (1976). 
17 Concentration of economic power vis-a-vis a monopoly was sought to be controlled by: 
(i) Providing under Seco 21 a procedure for seeking pennission from the Central 
Government for expansion of the undertaking. 
(ii) Restricting establishment of a new undertaking without the pennission of the Central 
Government. 
(iii) Prohibiting mergers and amalgamations without the approval of the Central 
Government. (Sec. 23) 
These provisions applied to undertakings which have individually or along with 
interconnected undertakings assets of the value of no less than Rs. 20 crores and dominant 
undertakings which produce, supply or otheIWise control not less than one-third of the total goods 
that are produced, supplied or distributed in the country. An undertaking to which these 
provisions apply is required to register with the Government under Seco 26. D. Amarchand 
(1976). 
-----------------------,..,--------------------------­
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was given to these terms. Frorn the point of licensing, concentration of wealth is 
referred to in terms oflarge industrial houses. Large industrial houses were defined 
as a single unit or a group with assets exceeding Rs. 10018 crores. Also, aH 
industrial houses with assets of over Rs. 100 crores carne under the MRTP Act. 
The definition of rnonopoly is not c1ear and the Act lays ernphasis on avoidance 
(not abolition) of monopoly and prevention of concentration of wealth. To c1arif)r 
sorne ofthe issues within the MRTP Act the Monopolies Enquiry Cornmission was 
set up and it rnade sorne recornmendations. First, it rneasured rnonopoly in terms 
of concentration of production and sale or, sale and concentration of econornic 
power in terms of industrial wea1th. Second, it recornmended the establishment of 
a permanent MRTP Cornmission. These recornmendations were incorporated into 
the MRTP Act which carne into force trorn June, 1970. 
The MRTP Act defines industry dominance In terms of the licensed 
capacity (of the undertaking) and the proportion of the goods supplied by the 
undertaking. That is, if the licensed capacity of an undertaking, inc1uding 
interconnected undertakings, is one-fourth of the total licensed capacity than the 
undertaking is considered "dominant", Ifthe total arnount ofgoods supplied by the 
undertaking, including interconnected subsidiaries, is greater than one-third of the 
18 MRTP (Amendment) Act 1982, Chapter m, par! A. 
----------------------------,----------;------­
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total goods of any description that are produced, supplied or distributed in India, 
then it is considered dominant. 19 
2.1.3. Control over the capital market 
The capital market in India was controlled too. Control over the issues of 
capital were enforced as early as 1943 through the ClC (Capital Issues Control) 
Act20 . The CIC Act was made a permanent legislation in 1956?1 We find that the 
government had imposed constraints on raising capital. 
"Control over capital issues was first issued in 1943 (the CIC Act), largely 
as a war-time temporary measure .. ..... In 1956, the Act was made a permanent 
legislation," to ensure, as far as possible, that investible funds did not find an outlet 
for investment in non-essential projects and to prevent them from being invested in 
a manner which ran counter to the policy ofthe government" .22 
According to the Act, a consent from the Controller of Capital issues is 
necessary in all cases where a company wants to raise capital aboye a certain 
19 MRTP Act, ibid. 
20 This was due to the fact that the British had a selfish motive in not letting the Indian capital 
market develop. A well development capital market in India would reduce India's dependence 
upon the British. Subsequently that would weaken the economic control over India. 
21 It is surprising that the Indian government (post independence) carried this legislation 
through. As the lack of a fully developcd capital market is one of tlle reasons why India could not 
de\'elop during the British rule. 
22 Finance Minister's spcech while introducing the Bill in the Lok Sabha, Lok Sabha Dcbates, 
Vol. 1, 1952, p. 584, in D. Amarchand (1976). 
11 
exempted limit. The Act applies to raising of capital by issue of securities, loans or 
even by creating a charge or lien on assets of the company if they exceed the 
exemption limit in a particular year. 
It was later realized that the stringent provisions of the Act did not serve 
any purpose. Thus, in November, 1966 certain changes were announced. Under 
the provision non government public limited companies can issue capital by 
obtaining a 'no-objection' certificate which will be issued within 30 days ofthe dáte 
of receipt of the application, provided, the application conforms to certain rules?3 
After this the procedure was slightly altered and instead of a 'no-objection' 
certificate, the applicants following the prescribed rules were al10wed to raise 
capital on receipt of 'acknowledgement of proposa\'. Further, to conform to the 
23 The operational guidelines for the issue ofconsents are: 
(i) gross over-capitalization or under-eapitalization are discouraged; 
(ii) ratio between debt and equiLy is not nonnally allowed to go beyond 1:2; 
(iii) ratio between preference and equity share capital is considered nonnal at 1:4 though 
a higher ratio of 1:3 may be agreed upon in exceptional cases; 
(iv) unduly high rates of dividend on preference shares and interest rates on debentures 
are discouraged though no rigid limits are set; 
(v) in cases of 'right issues', a condition is stipulated that while making an olTer, the 
company should simultaneously offer to all holders of rights an opportunity for additional shares 
and that if rights are not taken up, the balance left over should be distributed among applicants for 
additional shares; 
(vi) in cases of bonus shares, the issue is made out of free reserves built from genuine 
profits and not made in lieu of dividends; not more than two bonus issues will be allowed to a 
company over a period of five years; there should be a time lag of at least 18 months between two 
bonus issues and that afier the bonus issue, a total amount of not less than 33.3% of the increased 
paid-up capital is left in the residual reserves; 
(vii) with a view to ensure that promoters also should subscribe a minimum amount in 
newly floated companies a new Rule has been added in 1966 according to which the promoters 
should subscribe not less than 15% in an issue up to Rs. l crore and 10% in an issue excecding Rs. 
2 crore. 
D. Arnarchand (1976). 
--------------,.-----------------_._----------~---11--­
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MR.TP Act, all companies registered under Section 26 of the MR.TP Act have been 
disqualified from this exemption (with effect from October 1971). These 
companies need to get prior clearance under the MR.TP Act before applying for a 
'consent' under the Capital Issues ACt.24 'An appraisal of the working of the Act 
reveals that it has been very liberal in permitting capital issues.'2S 
3. The Regulatory Framework 
To study the effect ofthe imposition and the removal of regulatory controls 
upon the car and the scooter industry it is desirable to first look at the historical 
development of the regulatory framework in these industries. Then the change in 
industry structure is briefly. This is followed by an analysis of how the regulatory 
framework could have affected the industry structure, prices and, product quality. 
3.1. Car Industry 
The car industry was regulated from it's inception. Binding price ceilings 
and quantity controls were imposed upon the car industry from the start. Price 
controls were removed in 197526. Quantity controls applied to the car industry 
until the late 1980's.27,28 The car industry was under the provision ofthe IDR Act 
24 D. Amarchand (1976), p.l26. 
25 D. Amarchand (1976), p.126. 
26 After one ofthe manufacturers Premier Automobiles Limited contested the price controls in 
the market. Imprint, Nov. 1984, pAl. 
27 At present the government thinks that the existing licensed capacity is sufficient to meet the 
current demando 
28 Guidelines to Industries, Part TI, Govt. ofIndia, 1989. 
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which provided for monitoring ofthe prices. Ifthe government feh that the pricing 
policy of an industry is non optimal, it may interfere under the authority provided to 
it under Clause 15 ofthe IDR ACt,29 
3.2. Scooter Industry 
The scooter industry had also been regulated (both binding price ceiling and 
quantity restrictions) from it's inception. Price controls for the scooter industry 
were removed in 1975. Quantity controls were substantially reduced in the early 
1980's and were virtually non-existent now. The government was liberal with the 
issue oflicenses to the scooter industry. The reason for the liberal attitude was the 
socialistic objective as is stated in the Indian constitution. Under the socialistic 
objective cars were interpreted as being a luxury and scooters a necessity. Thus, 
the government policy towards the scooter manufactureres was tolerant from the 
start. Pesently the Iicensed capacity of the scooter industry is several times the 
29 Sectíon 15 ofthe IDR Act states: 
"... TIús Act empowers the government under elause 15 to cause investigation to be made into 
scheduled industries or undertakings where the Central Government is of the opinion that there 
has been or likely to be a substantial fall in the volume of production without justification, or a 
marked deterioration in the quality of any article or elass of artieles produced which can be 
avoided, or a rise in their price for which there is no justification, or where an industrial 
undertaking is being managed in a manner Iikely to cause serious injury or damage to the interests 
ofthe consumers or it is necessary to take such action in national interest". 
._-.__._----------------,-------------------------------. 
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30present demand for scooters. The scooter industl)' is constrained neither by price 
or by quantity restrictions. 
4. Industry Structure 
4.1. Car Industry 
The early entrants into the car industl)' were Hindustan Motors (HM) (in 
1942) and Premier Automobiles (pAL), in 1944. HM started 'production' in 1948 
by assembling vehicles and PAL started production in 1947. In 1953 there were 12 
firms producing (or assembling) cars and commercial vehicles.31 Most of these 
firms assembled units since onIy a few had a phased manufacturing programo At 
this stage the govemment decided to look into the functioning of the automobile 
sector. The Tariff Commission (1953) recommended that only companies with 
manufacturing capabilities should be allowed to operate. As a result several 
companies decided to stop assembly operations in India.32 The govemment 
recognized the manufacturing programs of onIy four firms, namely, Hindustan 
Motors Limited (HML), Premier Automobiles Limited (PAL), Automotive 
Products ofIndia Ltd. (APIL) and Ashok Motors (AM)33. Ofthese four, HML 
30 The licensed capacity of BAL and it's subsidial)', MSL, is sufficient to mcet the currcnt 
demando 
31 TarüfCornmission Rcport, 1953. 
32 The Ford Motor Company and General Motors decided to leave as they considcred the 
dcmand (in India) to be too small to set up manufacturing facilities in India. 
33 Ashok Motors manufactured commercial vehicles. 
... -._.._.._-------------,..,-----------------------_. 
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and PAL had a manufacturing program for cars whíle AM assembled Austin cars. 
APIL was not able to pursue it's manufacturing program as a result of whích the 
government withdrew it's approval. Thus, at the early stages (as of 1953) in the 
development of the car industry there were two car manufacturers. Of the earliest 
entrants in the car industry three firms, HML, PAL and SMPIL, existed prior to 
1953. Ofthese three HML and PAL had already started a manufacturing program 
while SMPIL34 assembled car units. At this stage the two dominanes units were 
HML and PAL whíle, SMPIL was not a major contendef6 . 
The car industry saw no entry until the late 1970's. In early 1970 Maruti 
(private LimitedT entered the car industry with a smal1 three-wheeled car. The 
second entrant was SAL (in 1976)and the third entrant was Maruti Udyog Limited 
(MUL) (nationalised in 1980 and started production in 1983).38 The initial intent of 
MUL was to manufacture a car (a smal1 car) withín the reach ofthe cornmon mano 
34 Standard Motors Product oflndia Limited. 
35 A firrn is referred to as dominant on the basis of it's market share. 
36 SMPIL had market shares similar to PAL from 1950 ti1l1954. 
37 Maruti (initiaIly) was a private Iimited company started by Sanjay Gandhi (son of (late) Mrs. 
Indira Gandhi). The CM was nol well accepted and the company stopped production. Maruli was 
nationalized (in 1980) after the dcath of Sanjay Gandhi (in aplane crash). 
38 "In the 1956 IPR automobiles (excluding road transport services) were not classilled under 
either Schedule A or Schedule B industries - which meant thal the future development of the 
aulomobile industry would be left, in general, lO the initiative and enlerprise of the privale seclor." 
Kathuria, S (1987). 
Il is interesting thal the governmenl decided lo enler the car industl)'. As, in principIe 
(according lo the IPR resolution of 1956) the government had decided nol to enter the car industl)'. 
_.-_.._-----------.,..,.--------,---------------------------­
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A technological collaboration was set up with Suzuki of Japan to manufacture 
sma11 (796cc) cars. A large number ofbookings were made, in-fact in 1990 MUL 
was still meeting bookings made in 1986. Maruti has since introduced a new, 
slightly larger (l000 cc), car aimed at competing with the car manufactured by 
PAL. Meanwhile, SMPIL had always been in the picture, though barely noticeable. 
Between 1950-1953 (data on car industry starts trom 1950) production in 
the car industry increased by 12.2% (trom 2221 to 2492). Between 1953 and 
1970, car production increased by a relatively large amount, trom 2492 cars in 
1953 to 35205 cars in 1970 (an in increase of 1412%). However, the car market 
was dominated by two major car makers, HML and PAL, while the third 
incumbent (SMPI) commanded a measely 1.2% of the market (see table-2.3). 
SMPI's market share dec1ined considerably trom 12.3% in 1950 to 1.2% in 1970. 
(One should point out that while HML and PAL sold larger cars, SMPI 
manufactured a smaller caro SMPI was not competing in the same market as the 
other two car makers.) 
In 1990 the Indian car industry had five incumbents, namely, HML, PAL, 
SMPIL, MUL and SAL39. Capacity utilization in the car industry is quite high, 
around 80%. The production in 1987 was 148,495. For individual market shares 
see table-2.1. 
39 At this stage there are a large number of incumbents, both, domestic and foreign. 
--.. -..---.-----------;-r----------­
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4.2. Scooter Industry 
The scooter industry started production in 1955. In 1990 it had seven 
incumbents. Over time it has witnessed a total of sixteen incumbents.4o API 
(Automotive Products ofIndia) was the first entrant in the Indian scooter industry. 
It started production in 1955. API was followed by BAL (Bajaj Auto Limited) in 
1960. Over time the scooter industry witnessed several changes and saw entry and 
exit by several firms. 
The total number of licensed41 producers in the scooter industry, as of 
1989, is seventeen (entrants are listed chronologically in Table-2.2). Many ofthese, 
had licenses to produce very small and, economically un-feasible amounts of 
42scooters.
40 Possibly more, the data sources list small incumbents as 'others'. 1 have becn able to locate 
only si:\1een 'active' (i.e, active at one time or another) producers between 1955-1989. 
41 Licensed producers does not imply that the have set up production facilities. Seventeen 
producers are listed in the yearly booklet brought out by Automotive Component Manufacturers 
Association (ACMA). However, looking at the production figures we see that the number of active 
producers, as of 1987, is seven. 
Licensed capacitics may difTer from installed capacity, in that installcd capacity should 
not exceed licensed capacity. 
42 The minimum economic scale for scooters is around 250,000 units. Sorne of the licenses are 
for a couple of thousand units. One of the possiblc reasons is that these licenses could be given 
undcr the governments small scale industry policy. As a small scale unit, functioning in backward 
areas, obtaining licenses is e:\1remely easy. This could have rcsulted in thc issue of (several) 
licenses to these units. 
---------.------r------------------------------­
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One interesting feature of the scooter industry is the utilization of licensed 
capacity. The ratio of output to Iicensed capacity was 40% in 1987.43 
Interestingly, BAL (with it's subsidiary Maharashtra Scooters Limited (MSL)) has 
sufficient licensed capacity to meet the industries current total output. Of the 
incumbents (as of 1990) BAL was the largest, followed by Lohia Motors Limited 
(LML), Kinetic Honda (KH) and, MSL. 
Looking at the technology in the scooter industry we see that 
technologically the industry was progressive. There exists a large choice between 
products and product diversification exists (at least) for the large manufacturers. 
Product diversification was facilitated by the government's policy of aIlowing 
'broad banding' in the car and the scooter industry. Under this policy producers 
can use the current installed capacity to produce differentiated products. 
Technological collaborations existed with Honda Motor Company and Piaggio of 
Japan and Italy, respectively. These companies are competing with brands 
manufactured and developed in India.44 
The scooter industry has seven active incumbents. Only one manufacturer, 
BAL, enjoyed a waiting list for the delivery of its vehicles. The industry had three 
43 Very low in comparison to the car industry where it is around SO%. Also, licenscd capacity 
does not mean that the capacity is also instaUed. Licensed capacity is always greater than or egual 
to the installed capacity. 
44 Piaggio had a production agreement with BAL. This agreement e:\-pired in the 70's and has 
since not been renewed. 
. _._-_.__._-----------.,.-,------------------_._--_. 
19
 
large finns and several fiinge manufacturers. The environment was competitive 
among the three dominant finns and product diversification exists. The industry 
structure has changed substantially (from the initial two incumbents to the present 
seven). 
5. EfTect Upon Technology Used 
This section does not give a detailed analysis ofthe technological structure 
of the individual finn. The on technology choice of regulatory controls is studied. 
Two factors that can affect the choice of technology of the car and the scooter 
industry are guotas and the tax structure. Tax structure seems to affect the choice 
of technology directly, while the effect of the quotas can be traced to the choice of 
the available technology due to the quantity restriction. That is, finns may in-fact 
choose inefficient technolgy as the quota limits the finns' choices in tenns of 
exploiting economies of scale. Thus, high cost technologies may be adopted by the 
finns. 
The tax strueture prevalent before the refonns was cascading. Intennediate 
goods were being taxed at every stage of production. As a result the car 
manufacturers were vertically integrated (to avoid being taxed at each stage of 
production4S). The manufacturers were unable to use their available capital in the 
most efficient manner. For example, India had an under-developed capital market. 
As a result finns did not have access to capital. Thus, the limited resources 
45 Only between firms' sales were taxed and not within firm transfers. 
---...._----------------------,-------------------------------­
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available were not efficienlty used. The tax structure has subsequentiy been 
modified. The new tax structure is called is called MODVAT (Modified Value 
Added Tax). The impact of MODVAT is evident as recentiy there has been an 
increase in the spare parts manufacturers (sub contracting with the manufacturers). 
The effect of quotas upon the capital structure depends upon the choice of 
the available technology and the competition prevalent in the market. That is, 
quotas may limit one to a given plant size and not enable one to reap economies of 
scale. The minimum economic scale (MES) for the car industry is 50,000 units and 
250,000 for the scooter industry. A1so, the lack of competition (quotas blocking 
entry) may take away the incentive to improve the existing technology. We will 
address these questions while looking at the impact ofthe regulatory controls upon 
the car and scooter industry. 
S.l. Car Industry 
The car industry started production with technological collaborations with 
foreign manufacturers. HML collaborated with Monis and PAL with Fiat. They 
had no in built research and development (R&D) and, the Indian economy was 
closed to technological imports (at the time of independence). Thus, the car 
makers had no choice but to upgrade the technology they inherited. One can say 
that price controls (effective until 1975) may have limited the amount of capital 
available to the manufacturers and as a result no in house R&D was attempted. 
However, one sees that even after the controls were removed (in 1976) no serious 
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attempt was made by the manufacturers to set up R&D facilities. One tends to 
conclude that the intent to set up R&D facilities on the part of the manufacturers 
was not there. 
We also see that the MES for the car industry is 250,000 units per year. 46 
The total output ofthe car makers was wel1 under 250,000 (see table-2.3 on sales) 
until 1983. The willingness to expand capacity did not seem to exist as we notice 
that the ratio of sales to licensed capacity (for the years the data is available) is 
around 0.5. That is, the output was nearly one-halfthat ofthe licensed capacity. 
During this time the car makers commanded a waiting time for delivery of around 
three years. Thus sales equal output in every year until for manufacturers 
cornmanding a waiting list. 
One reason the manufacturers did not expand capacity may have been due 
to the lack ofcompetition. It is worthwhile to note that explicit price controls were 
removed in 1975. Even after the removal of these market one sees that the 
manufaturers cornmanded a waiting period before delivery. Even though, between 
1974 and 1975 prices increased by 33% for HML and 30% for PAL, the price 
increase was not sufficient to remove the delivery lag. 
Thus, that tight regulation (no domestic or foreign competition) may have 
resulted in a market with outdated and inefficient technology. The choice of the 
46 Kannokolias, Y, Intemational Finance Corporation, Discussion Paper no.7, 1989. 
....--...----.-~------.-----r_-------------------------_. 
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technology was not efficient and no subsequent improvements were made due to 
the lack of competition. This argument is supported by the fact that the car 
manufacturers decided to upgrade technology and expand capacity only after entry 
occurred in the car market. 
5.2. Scooter Industry 
The scooter industry faced more favorable conditions than did the car 
industry. Both the manufacturers, BAL and API, had technological collaborations 
with Italian manufacturers. Quotas affected the choice of capacity (or capital) by 
the scooter manufacturers. That is, capacity was not expanded and a waiting list 
(two to three years) was maintained by the manufacturers.47 However, soon after 
the quotas were relaxed and the market saw substantial entry one notices that BAL 
expanded capacity in response to the entry ofother firrns. 
The scooter industry updated it's technology through indigenous R&D. 
API was unable to keep pace with the rapidly changing market and eventually 
stopped production. In the scooter industry quotas afl'ected the choice of 
technology more than anything else. Technologically, the scooter industry did 
better than the car industry in that indigenous technology was developed. 
6. The Gainers and the Losers 
47 The reason for maintaining the waiting Iist may be the same as was for the car 
manufacturers, that is, waiting lists were a buffer against competition. 
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The problem faced here is how do we identify gainers and losers? To study 
the gainers and the losers from the regulatory process we first need to identify the 
factors that provide to us an indicator of, how one gains or loses? Of course, a 
producers gain· cannot be directly construed as a consumers loss in a dynamic 
environment. Thus we will identify specific factors that will serve as indicators in 
our analysis. 
A consumer is worse off if it does not get the benefit from market 
competition, from the choice of goods, from good quality products, and from the 
quantity ofthe goods supplied to it (that ¡s, whether or not there exists (existed) a 
prolonged shortage of the good in question). For the producers, a producer 
benefits from barriers to entry (that it may create, have created, for its own benefit), 
shows no inc1ination to adopt new technologies, gains through an increase in the 
concentration of wealth, and does not invest in R&D (which it would have, with 
market competition). In the following analysis the gainers and the losers are 
studied, before and after, the imposition and the removal ofthe regulatory controls. 
6.1. Before the Removel ofMarket Controls 
6.1.1. The Consumers in the Car and the Scooter Industry 
The consumers were definitely worse offwhen the market controls were in 
effect. Below we willlook at the car and the scooter industry separately. 
Car Industry: 
.-.-.-----.--------------r----------------------------­
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In the car market the quota restrictions effectively blocked entry. As a 
result there was no market competition to stir the incumbent producers into 
activity. This is high1ighted by the fact that in the car industry, until the removal of 
the market controls, no effort was made to upgrade the models the manufacturers 
had inherited from Morris (50's technology) and Fiat (early 60's technology) 
(besides cosmetic changes). The car market had (only) two major incumbents 
(with a periphery of bungling entrants)48. Each producer had only one model to 
offer (each model had different categories because ofthe available options). Until 
the market controls were eased we see that consumers in the car market were 
limited to a choice ofonly two models. As far as the product quality is concemed it 
would suffice to say that technologically the Indian car industry was several 
decades behind the intemational standards. A1so, the consumer's demand was not 
being satisfied by the producers. There existed a waiting-list49 for several years 
before the car was delivered to the consumers. The excess demand created a 
parallel market in the car industry (quasi-rents were being extracted).so Only after 
the easing of these market controls one saw a virtual elimination of the excess 
demand for PAL and HML. 
48 These were peripheral producers who shared an extremely small amount of the small market (see table­
2.3). 
49 A waiting Iist is defined when current demand (the number of units registered by buyers with an in 
intent to buy) is met at a future date. 
sO¡¡aving booked a car was considered a sound investmcnt as the premiums could be as high 40% of the 
car's selling price. 
~-~-~~~~~~----"-----'------'--r----------¡-----------------' 
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The market controls definitely made the consumers worse off The 
consumers were limited to a choice of two (antiquated) car models, there was 
practical1y no market competition (the incumbent producers catered to different 
subsections of the car market, HAL producing the larger car while PAL produced 
the smaller car) and, there was insufficient supply in the car market (resulting in 
quasi-rents). Overall, we see that consumers in the car industry did not gain 
because ofthe market controls. 
Scooter Industry: 
The scenario in the scooter industry was relatively healthy (compared to the 
car industry). One effect ofthe market controls was quiet c1ear, that is, the market 
controls limited entry into the car market (see table-2.5 for list of incumbents). 
There existed two major producers (BAL and API) and the other scooter 
manufacturers cornmanded a small portion ofthe market (BAL and API dominated 
the market for three decades). We see that there was sorne entry after the price 
controls were removed in the scooter industry (1975), however, most of the 
entrants left the market (see table-2.4). As the governments attitude towards the 
scooter industry was more liberal (than the car industry) the scooter industry saw 
more competition, however, the majority of the competition carne after the market 
controls were relaxed. Looking at product, the scooter industry had more to offer, 
BAL had several scooter models and API had two models to offer. Thus, the 
consumers in the scooter market had 'sorne' product choice. As far as the quality of 
.-.-------.-------------r-----------------------------. 
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the scooters was concemed we see that BAL produced scooters of good quality 
while API produced scooters of slightly lower qualitl 1. (However, none of the 
scooters were of extremely bad quality.) As far as consumer demand being met, 
we see that as long as the market controls remained in effect there existed a lag 
before the scooters were delivered (the lag varied from two to four years depending 
upon the brand and the make). This (the lag), resulted in the creation of a parallel 
market where the scooters cornmanded a premium (the amount one would pay 
over and aboye the scooter price, essentially, quasi rent). 
The consumers in the scooter market had 'sorne' product choice and the 
product quality was 'tolerable'. The consumers were worse off due to the existence 
ofexcess demand, and the consequent quasi-rents, in the scooter market. 
6.1.2. The Producers in the Car and the Scooter Industry 
The producers, both in the car and the scooter industry, were shielded from 
competition for nearly three decades. The government being more stringent about 
granting licenses to the car manufacturers created a market that had only two major 
producers for a long period of time. The scooter industry saw more producers 
after the price controls were lifted (1975). However, most of the entrants exited 
the market soon after (see table-2.4). 
51 It hard to find mesurable observables for 'quality'. It is assumed that quality is 
obscrvablein the sense that everyonc agrees that one quality is bcttcr than another. 
------------ ----------,.--,-----------,-------------------­
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It is useful to identify sorne of the factors that may provide an 
indication of whether the car and the scooter producers benefitted from the 
imposition of the market controls. Sorne of the factors that we can take as an 
indicators ofbenefitting from the market controls are, lack of competition, increase 
in concentration of wealth, attempts at pre-emption and non implementation of 
licensed capacity (buying licenses to pre-empt entry into the market) and, lack of 
R&D (which may follow from lack ofcompetition 
Car Industry: 
The government was quite strict in giving licenses to the car industry. 
Thus, the car industry saw only two major incumbents for a long period of time. 
These two (major) incumbents, HAL and PAL, catered to two different sections of 
the market. As a result ofthe government policy (on quotas to the car industry) the 
car manufacturers saw no competition until the early eighties. The result, no effort 
was made to innovate and develop better quality products. Until the entry ofMUL 
the incumbent car manufacturers were producing cars with obsolete technology. It 
is obvious that an effort to innovate was not made as no competition was 
forthcorning. Thus the lack of competition definitely benefitted the car industry 
(the car manufacturers would not have been able to sustain with a similar 
lackadaisical attitude ifthe market were competitive). 
As far as concentration of wealth is concerned we see that the car 
producers, being the two major incumbents, shared the benefits of the car market 
'-'-'---'---------------r----------------------------­
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between themselves. One must also point out that studies on the effect of licensing
 
on concentration of wealth showed that the government plans (Five Year Plans)
 
benefitted many top industrial houses ofthe country.S2
 
Scooter Industry;
 
We see that the scooter industry had two dominant producers, BAL and 
API, for a long period of time. However, the product quality in the scooter 
industry, especially BAL, was good. The manufacturers in the scooter industry 
profited after the removal of the price controls. The scooter market was more 
competitive than the car market. The scooter manufacturers improved product 
quality (probably because of the governments 'soft' policy towards the scooter 
industry which made entry more probable than for the car industry) and consistently 
sold good quality products. 
As far as the incumbents benefiting from the government controls, one can 
see that the two major incumbents (BAL and API) commanded 80-90% of the 
market share (the Indian scooter market has expanded consistently). Thus, 
licensing definitely helped the incumbents increase, or maintain, their market share. 
One sees a noticeable shift in the market shares (on the basis of sales) after the 
easing ofthe quantity restrictions (see table-2.4). 
S2 D. Amarchand, ibid. 
..~-.~._.~-----------------'--r----------'-------------------
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As far as preemption is concemed it is not easy to find specific instances (of 
pre-emption) or non-implementation oflicenses by the car or the scooter industry. 
However, looking at the overall trend one sees that of the 10,016 licenses issued 
during 1955-56,6181 were implemented in time, 672 were partially implemented, 
and 1732 were surrendered or revoked by the licensing authority (inforrnation was 
not available on 148 licenses). The large industrial sector implemented about 72% 
ofthe licenses granted to it, 16% were revoked or surrendered and, 12% were not 
implemented. S3 
Looking at pre-emption we see that (from the inforrnation available about 
933 cases, where large industrial houses accounted for 323 licenses). Of these 
(933) licenses 130 were surrendered, or revoked, within two years of issue, 85 in 
three years, 44 in four years and, 64 in more than four years. 54 Thus, preemption 
was being used in the industry and the incumbent was able to deter entry in a 
market and domínate it. 
One can see that the producers in the car industry gained from the lack of 
competition. As a result we see that mínimal eifort was made towards R&D and, 
the consumers were supplied with goods that were consistently of poor quality 
(decades behind the intemational quality). 
53 ¡bid. 
54 ¡bid. 
._. '-'--'---'---~----------..,---------------------------'---
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Looking at the scooter industry we see that because of licensing the 
incumbent producers cornmanded a large share of a growing market. The product 
was of average to good quality, however, the consumers suffered as they had to 
wait for the delivery of the good. 
6.2. After Removal of Regulatory Controls 
6.2.1. The Consumers in the Car and the Scooter Industry 
Car Industry: 
After the removal of the market controls one sees that the consumers 
definitely benefitted from the easing ofthe market controls. After the easing ofthe 
quantity restrictions there was entry into the market (the two major entrants being 
MUL and SMPIL). In a couple of years MUL commanded 60% of the market 
share (see table-2.3). (Earlier consumers had to wait two to three years for the 
delivery of cars made by HML and PAL. In 1989 scooters be obtained with no 
delivery lags.) As a result it is seen that both, HML and PAL, decided to diversify 
and offer more models for sale. The car industry now offers several models and the 
consumers have the choice of a larger number of better quality models. We thus 
see that the consumers (as far as product choice and product quality are 
concerened) have benefitted from the removal ofthe market controls. 
Scooter Industry: 
The consumers also benefitted in the scooter industry from the removal of 
the market controls. As a result ofthe easing of quantity restrictions the consumers 
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had access to products of intemational quality.55 Lag time before the delivery of a 
scooter is practical1y non-existent (except for a couple ofBAL models). We thus 
see that the consumers are definitely better off after the removal of the market 
controls. 
6.2.2. The Producers in the Car and the Scooter Industry
 
Car Industry:
 
In the car industry we see that market competition forced the producers to 
be competitive and more efficient. 56 Entry into the market indicates that there was 
room in the market for more manufacturers (most of the incumbents have not 
exited the market). It seems that the producers also benefitted from the removal of 
the market controls, as the market controls forced them to be efficient. (Though, 
the earlier incumbents definitely lost from the easing ofthe market controls as they 
lost their market share to the entrants.) 
Scooter Industry: 
The scooter industry saw large entry due to the easing of the market 
controls. The earlier ineumbents witnessed a pereentage decrease in their market 
share, however, the number of units they sold (except API) did not decrease. The 
industry now offers several good quality products. Competition has foreed the 
55 The car market now has scooters made by Honda (Japan) and Piaggio (Italy). 
56 PAL made profits in the fiscal year 1988-89 after bcing in red for several years. India Today, Nov. 15,
 
1989.
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manufacturers to be innovative and competitive (one sees that the scooter prices of 
al1 the models are close to each other). Overal1, the scooter industry has benefitted 
from the easing ofthe market controls. 
One interesting question emerging out of al1 of this is that why would the 
industrialists, especial1y in the car industry, support deregulation? This can be 
looked at from two angles. First, in principIe the government had agreed to stay 
out of the industry. However, the government was the first entrant into the car 
industry when it restarted the car company of (late) Mr. Sanjay Gandhi. They were 
not left with much choice as the new entrant, MUL, quickIy stole a large chunk of 
the market share from the incumbents. Secondly, looking at an economy like India 
that has grown substantialIy since independence. We see that India had developed 
a substantial1y large middle c1ass. The earlier controls could have been very 
restrictive such that the incumbents realized that profits would increase with 
expansion of capacities. Thus, one can argue that deregulation was also sought in 
their own self interest. The incumbents realized that the demand had shifted to the 
right substantial1y over the years. 
7. Conc1usion 
Industrial policy in India was molded by the experience (of the Indians) 
with the British rule. As a result it was decided to erect entry barriers (such as, 
licensing) on, both internal and external trade. Evidence suggests that the 
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industrialists played a major role in the formulation of the industrial policy and were 
for the regulation ofthe Indian industry. 
For the car and scooter industry the entry baniers (licensing) provided an 
umbrella for theincumbents. As a result the incumbents made no major effort to 
innovate or invent. The scooter industry had better quality products as the threat to 
entry was credible. After nearly three decades of protection the industry had 
outmoded products resulting from lack oftechnological advancement. 
After the market controls were eased in both the industries product quality 
and product choice improved in both the industries. Both, the car and the scooter 
industry, witnessed dramatic technological changes (the latent incumbents were 
forced to improve upon their technology). Both the car and the scooter industry 
became competitive due to entry in the markets. 
Looking at the gainers and the losers from the regulation, and the 
subsequent deregulation one sees that the consumers benefitted from the easing of 
the market controls. That is, product quality improved, product choice increased, 
and the waiting period for the delivery ofthe good (which was several years prior 
to deregulation) practically vanished. This also eliminated the parallel market for 
the car and scooter bookings (which were transferable). As a result premiums on 
most ofthe products have vanished. The consumers have definitely benefitted from 
the deregulatory process. 
--------------------r-----------------------------
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As far as the producers are concemed, deregulation removed the entry 
baniers. This resu1ted in entry, forcing the incumbents to become efficient. As a 
result sorne of the incumbents reduced wastes and improved industry performance. 
(For example, the PAL group has been in the red for several years. Recently, they 
made profits, and the tumaround is attributed to "overhaul upgrade and 
modernization ofthe key manufacturing facilities and products".)57 
57 India Today, Nov. 15, 1989. 
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TABLE-l 
EX-FACTORYNET DEALERPRlCES FOR CARS 
AMBASSADOR PADMINI MUL MUL· 
X-NDP IND X-NDP IND NDP IND X-NDp· IND* 
1965 11564 100 10068 100 
1966 12775 110 11636 116 
1967 13919 120 12664 126 
1968 14021 121 12679 126 
1969 14075 122 12660 126 
1970 14075 122 14862 148 
1971 15769 136 14862 148 
1972 15896 137 15046 149 
1973 15848 137 15556 155 
1974 17250 149 17080 170 
1975 22925 198 22211 221 
1976 21536 186 22011 219 
1977 22286 193 22895 227 
1978 23986 207 24057 239 
1979 27667 239 26397 262 
1980 30362 263 34803 346 
1981 38062 329 40815 405 
1982 48587 420 44577 443 
1983 48587 420 47583 473 47500 100 41304 100 
1984 48587 420 46080 458 49383 104 43141 104 
1985 51787 448 49932 496 50325 106 44071 107 
1986 59547 515 54300 539 59617 126 47221 114 
19871 62709 542 56945 566 72050 152 57069 138 
....•...._-_.------------,-----------------------_. 
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1988 65872 570 59590 592 75235 158 59592 144 
1989 73070 632 70414 699 86446 182 63380 153 
* The price avaiable from MUL was the net-dealer price (NDP) inclusive of 
excise. The ex-factory NDP (X-NDP) computed here is an obtained from the 
NDP less excise duty. 
1. 1987 pricesfor Ambassador and Padmini are average of 1986 and 1988 due 
to non availibility ofNDP for 1987. 
------------_._-----------,-,----------,-----------------
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TABLE-2 
EX-FACTORY NET DEALER SCOOTER PRICES 
BAL API 
YEAR NDp· INDEX NDp· INDEX 
1965 1960 100 1955 100 
1966 1968 100 2042 104 
1967 2263 115 2275 116 
1968 2280 116 2238 114 
1969 2280 116 2238 114 
1970 2280 116 2230 114 
1971 2280 116 2230 114 
1972 2280 116 2230 114 
1973 2280 116 2304 118 
1974 2306 118 2605 133 
1975 2880 147 3365 172 
1976 2976 152 3565 182 
1978 3054 156 3506 182 
1979 3077 157 4066 179 
1980 3560 182 4926 208 
1981 3885 198 5211 252 
1982 4560 233 5726 267 
1983 5100 260 5726 293 
1984 5280 269 5827 293 
1985 5540 283 6227 298 
1986 6000 306 7250 319 
1987 6490 331 7250 371 
1988 6960 355 7250 371 
* ex-factory net dealer prices. 
"""""-----"-----------,------------------------
YEAR HML(P) 
1950 1469 
1951 2161 
1952 1185 
1953 1847 
1954 2607 
1955 4874 
1956 5781 
1957 5086 
1958 4809 
1959 5745 
1960 9217 
1961 11056 
1962 13438 
1963 8621 
1964 15351 
1965 15558 
1966 19469 
1967 20515 
1968 22687 
1969 21560 
1970 22703 
1971 24656 
1972 24634 
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TABLE-3 
PRODUCTION OF CARS - BY MAKE 
PAL(P) SALep) SMPI(P) MUL 
478 274 
703 614 
522 386 
344 301 
1413 975 
3581 1546 
5722 1836 
4866 2251 
1843 1462 
4459 1789 
6516 3364 
7197 3409 
6247 3641 
3750 3340 
3868 4008 
5673 3559 
7030 1098 
10055 2774 
12276 2345 
12218 1405 
12054 448 
12821 827 
13611 583 
39 
1973 25440 13883 614 
1974 20129 14213 1666 
1975 9322 13630 123 
1976 16422 14973 54 161 
1977 20256 17481 171 111 
1978 20987 12931 331 117 
1979 17523 11550 106 56 
1980 21752 8729 51 6 
1981 23197 18874 31 4 
1982 21836 20711 126 1 
1983 23631 20929 302 1 175 
I 
1984 22127 26620 930 11876 
1985 22238 29223 523 11 34825 
1986 22387 28501 1557 1557 63504 
1987 25561 31191 484 484 90909 
..........---------------r-------------------------.  
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TABLE-4 
PRODUCTION OF SCOOTERS BY MANUFACTIJRER AND BRAND 
YEAR API MAC LAMBY APSL ASVL BAL EIL 
1955 529 
1956 3068 
1957 4098 
1958 2923 
1959 2764 
1960 9459 2535 
1961 8071 4746 
1962 9589 4368 361 
1963 8632 6148 739 
1964 10412 8339 1292 
1965 10143 8376 1795 
1966 8632 10389 1950 
1967 13270 15982 1050 
1968 16367 19040 545 
1969 22372 26431 377 90 
1970 25335 32091 199 767 
1971 24504 39798 50 2828 
1972 20851 40332 80 3468 
1973 1225 23543 50361 24 2929 
1974 5008 24404 55126 1 1141 
1975 29754 54495 538 
1976 1550 31436 3663 28 76138 680 
1977 1326 20284 8281 675 68349 552 
..--.--------------.,.-r----------,--------. 
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1978 969 25753 9503 884 49003 361 
1979 1001 25337 9453 30289 
1980 874 22531 10564 71682 
1981 1579 19705 10580 84170 
1982 1248 22834 10394 136020 
1983 88 14414 5312 167179 
1984 249 9446 5345 186773 
1985 51 7053 23353 258967 
1986 5275 11572 366807 
1987 209 931 415968 
Table-4 contd. 
LAMBRETTA 
YEAR GSIC KSL MSL PSL VIJAI CENTO WBSL 
1971 21 
1972 100 
1973 
1974 2 
1975 131 10595 
1976 332 137 4434 1 28054 7 
1977 192 3362 23199 2016 16489 720 
1978 177 3325 28193 2281 18985 
1979 763 2873 19491 32485 
1980 3417 1374 25006 36195 
1981 5953 1098 24546 32373 
1982 4131 729 32597 36813 1061 
1983 3857 45 53482 18443 8480 
1984 4906 56337 19554 4471 
.......--...------------r--------------------------.  
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1985 1659 58650 28865 1324 
1986 90739 6060 354 
1987 92732 1288 41 
Table-4 contd. -
YEAR VESPA(LML) KH 
1983 250 
1984 10222 
1985 41359 
1986 101558 12769 
1987 72292 21836 
- ---------_._--------.,.--,-----------,------
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TABLE-5 
ENTRY AND EXIT IN THE SCOOTER INDUSTRY 
FIRM BRAND 
ENTRY· / EXIT# 
1Automobile Products ofIndia Ltd. Lamby 1955 
-
lBajaj Auto Limited VespaIBajaj 1960 -
Enfield India Limited Fantabulus 1962 1975 
Escorts Limited Rajdoot 1969 1979 
Girnar Scooters Limited Girnar 1971 1986 
Automobile Products ofIndia Ltd. Mac. 1973 1986 
lScooters India Limited Vijai 1975 -
1Andhra Pradesh Scooters Limited Pushpak 1976 -
Aravali Svachalit Vahan Limited Aravali 1976 1979 
Karnataka Scooters Limited Falcon 1976 1984 
lMaharashtra Scooters Limited Priya 1976 
-
West Bengal Scooters Limited Digvijai 1976 1978 
Punjab Scooters Limited Kesari 1977 1979 
lScooters India Limited Cento 1982 -
lLohia Motors Limited XEI00cc 1983 
-
lKinetic Honda 
-
1986 
-
2Kelvinator ofIndia Limited 
- 1984 -
1 2Gujarat Narrnada Auto Limited Narmada 150 1986 
-
* Year production started. 
# Year production stopped. This information is as of 1988. 
1 Listed in Automotive Buyers Guide, ACMA, 1989. That IS , these 
companies are currently (as of 1988) producing. 
2 No output data currently available. 
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TABLE-6 
TOTAL PRODUCTION OF CARS ANO SCOOTERS 
YEAR CARS 
1950 2221 
1951 3478 
1952 2093 
1953 2492 
1954 4995 
1955 10001 
1956 13339 
1957 12203 
1958 8114 
1959 11993 
1960 19097 
1961 21662 
1962 23326 
1963 15711 
1964 23277 
1965 24790 
1966 27597 
1967 33344 
1968 37308 
1969 35183 
1970 38828 
1971 38304 
1972 38828 
SCOOTERS 
-
-
-
-
-
529 
3068 
4098 
2923 
2764 
11994 
12817 
14318 
15519 
20043 
20314 
20971 
30302 
35952 
49270 
58392 
67201 
64831 
~-~~~~~-~---~~---"---------..,......,---------,----------------
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1973 39937 78082 
1974 36008 85682 
1975 23075 101763 
1976 31610 151309 
1977 38019 160295 
1978 34366 168033 
1979 29235 152951 
1980 30538 209943 
1981 42106 202884 
1982 42674 250727 
1983 45090 273850 
1984 64013 297303 
1985 102456 422307 
1986 116004 595150 
1987 148495 625667 
1988 159841 659810 
"'~""'--"-"---'----------,-------------------------
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Table-7 
SCHEDULE OF INDUSTRIES 
SCHEDULE-A: 
lo Anns and ammunition and allied defense equipment. 
20 Atomic Energy. 
3. Iron and steel. 
4. Heavy castings and forgings ofiron and steel. 
5. Heavy plant and machine'Y required for iron and steel production, for mining, for 
machine tool manufacture, and for such other basic industries as may be specified 
by the government. 
6. Heavy electrical plant inc1uding large hydraulic and steam turbineso 
7. Coal and ligniteo 
80 Mineral oilso 
90 Mining of iron ore, manganese ore, chrome ore, gypsum, sulphur, gold, and 
diamondo 
la. Mining and processing ofcopper, lead, zinc, tin, molybdenum, and wolfram. 
11. Minerals specified in the schedule to the Atomic Energy (Control ofProduction 
and Use) Order, 19530 
12. Aircrafto 
13 o Air transporto 
140 Railway transport 
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Table-7 continued-
15. Shipbuilding. 
16. Telephone and telephone cables, telegraph, and wireless apparatus (excluding 
radio receiving sets). 
17. Generation and distribution ofelectricity. 
SCHEDULE-B: 
l. AlI other minerals except "minor minerals" as defined in Section 3 of the 
Minerals Concession Rules 1949. 
2. Aluminum and other non-ferrous metals not included in Schedule-A. 
3. Machine tools. 
4. Ferro-alloys and tool steels. 
5. Basic and intermediate products required by chemical industries such as the 
manufacture ofdrugs, dye-stuffs and, plastics. 
6. Antibiotics and other essential drugs. 
7. Fertilizers. 
8. Synthetic rubber. 
9. Carbonization of coal. 
10. Chernical pulpo 
11. Road transporto 
12. Sea transporto 
- ---..-------------r-------------------__ 
